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Archive for April 2013

Trains not included, part two

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Railnews mischief makingAlthough the Department for Transport has said it has been “totally clear and transparent about the costs of HS2” the £8 billion cost of rolling stock is not included in the headline figure. According to Railnews’ Alan Marshall, rolling stock cost is separate, because ‘that will be the responsibility of the operator or operators that run the trains on the network’.

No one has decided yet whether HS2, in 10 or more years time, will be a franchise, a concession or an open access operation, or a mix of these.

When HS1 was built, its budget (which was not exceeded) did not include the cost of trains. The international trains that use it today are the responsibility of Eurostar, which pays for them out of the revenue it earns from passengers.

Previous governments, not train operators, decided who would be the suppliers of the domestic and international passenger trains currently running on HS1. And the current government is heavily involved in train contracts like Thameslink, Crossrail, Pendolino, and the Intercity Express Programme (use of IEP was mandated in the Great Western franchise renewal).

The idea that ‘Eurostar pays for the costs of its trains out of the revenue it earns from passengers’, is nonsense. Since it started up, Eurostar has been either loss-making or barely profitable, and so dependent on government support.

'Eurostar driven to £2.6 billion losses', Daily Express, 2010-01-03

Because HS1 domestic services are bundled with Kent classic trains in an integrated franchise, there is no way of knowing how much money they lose. But it is known that rail commuters from Ashford to London have been getting a £100-a-week subsidy.

If a high speed rail franchisee had a free choice on rolling stock, it’s likely the specification would be for a maximum speed of 249 km/h — undermining HS2’s entire design fundamentals. Because standard (conventional speed) trains are much cheaper to buy and operate.

Mr Marshall went on to claim that the cost of HS2 would be ‘offset by massive income from passengers and the socio/economic benefits to the economy that will arise from regeneration and job creation.’

HS2 Ltd’s chairman Doug Oakervee estimates the benefit/cost ratio of the whole ‘Y’ network will be 2.6, or around £85 billion over 60 years return on an investment of £33 billion.

But Mr Oakervee believes that the 2.6 figure is a ‘very conservative’ one, based on his previous experience of developing the Crossrail scheme, and the realities of booming passenger traffic on HS1’s domestic services, even with premium fares — whereas the HS2 business case assumes fares would continue to be charged on the same basis as now.

The last published BCR figure (August 2012) for the Y network was 1.9, or 2.5 with ‘wider economic benefits’. Since then, the costs have increased, and HS2 Ltd has belatedly proposed extensive changes in London.

Twitter account @bonswattomer on HS2 wider economic benefits

Rather than doing pretend economics, it might have been better if Mr Oakervee had concentrated on his primary responsibilities as HS2 chairman, i.e.

Formulating the Board’s strategy;

Ensuring that the Board, in reaching decisions across its full remit including the route design and environmental assessment, takes proper account of guidance provided by the Department for Transport or the Secretary of State;

Encouraging high standards of regularity and propriety; and,

Promoting HS2 to the general public.

Along with Alison Munro, Mr Oakervee must bear much of the responsibility for the failure to get to grips with the unrealistic ‘Bigfoot’ Euston station rebuild, and continued development of a massively disruptive overground alignment in Ealing. The costs incurred by the delay in cancelling Bigfoot, and surface running in West London, must be considerable.

Written by beleben

April 29, 2013 at 1:24 pm

Debunking the bunk

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HS2, debunking the bunk


More than 80% of passengers on HS2 would be travelling to, or, from London

Written by beleben

April 28, 2013 at 10:46 am

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HS2 and decreased connectivity, part three

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The HS2 post-2026/2033 documentation does not say much about sleeper services between London and Scotland. What is the likelihood that such services would continue post-HS2?

When France’s TGV network was expanded, classic night trains were progressively cut back, and on some routes, completely withdrawn. Relations affected included: Paris — Bretagne; Lyon — Bordeaux; and Paris — Strasbourg.

Written by beleben

April 26, 2013 at 10:48 am

Posted in High speed rail, HS2

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HS2 and decreased connectivity, part two

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HS2 Ltd, August 2012: the intention is to curtail ECML main line services at Edinburgh

HS2 Ltd’s “Updated economic case for HS2 (August 2012): Explanation of the service patterns” also demonstrated the intention to terminate East Coast Main Line services from London at Edinburgh. (It’s worth bearing in mind that the Intercity Express Programme was largely dreamed up to allow through service to places beyond Edinburgh.)

In the Rail Package 6 concept, pendular trains would run at up 225 km/h from London to Edinburgh in around 210 minutes — and continue to other destinations (i.e., no change of train needed at Edinburgh). Compared to HS2, Aberdeen electrification costs are trivial.

So, compared to the Rail Package 6 concept, HS2 would result in slower and less convenient journeys to and from points such as Dundee, Falkirk, Aberdeen, and Perth.

Written by beleben

April 26, 2013 at 10:38 am

Posted in HS2, Planning, Politics

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HS2 and decreased connectivity

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HS2 Ltd, August 2012, proposed WCML service patterns, Crewe to Euston

Decreased classic connectivity is a major problem in the HS2 concept, and something which its lobbyists find difficult to address truthfully. In February 2012, Centro’s publicly-funded Go HS2 high speed rail campaign claimed that “the HS2 alternative threatens stations in the West Midlands“. Part of the Go HS2 misinformation strategy is to close down discussion, and suggest that there is only one ‘alternative’ to HS2: the 51m scheme. But 51m is just one of many possible approaches to developing the classic railway.

There is no reason to believe that upgrading the West Coast Main Line would necessitate any closure of stations. Nor is there any reason to believe that upgrading of the West Coast Main Line would reduce service levels. In fact, HS2 Ltd’s “Updated economic case for HS2 (August 2012): Explanation of the service patterns” suggested that the HS2 scheme would reduce classic connectivity. As can be seen from the extract from the service table (above), the post-HS2 Crewe to London service would decrease from thirteen to eight trains per day.

Written by beleben

April 25, 2013 at 5:41 pm

Posted in Centro

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Imitation of tram, part three

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In their 18-page response to criticism of the New Generation Transport project, Leeds city council and West Yorkshire PTE (‘Metro’) stressed how ‘tram-like’ the NGT system would be. But as Caen and Nancy demonstrated, there is no reason why a trolleybus system should be designed to imitate a tramway.

[Critical statement] Interestingly, results from five ‘major light rail systems’ in the UK have shown that ‘while there has been a modal shift from cars to light rail of up to 20 per cent, the impact on congestion has been a lot less or nil.’

[WYPTE] Comment: It is unclear what point is being made here. Tram systems are hugely successful in the UK and practically all (with exception of Sheffield, which has been used as an example in this paper) have out-performed the initial forecasts. It should also be remembered that NGT will be introduced while significant population growth in Leeds is also occurring. NGT is forecast to lead to an increased use of public transport. The absence of NGT will lead to exacerbation of congestion.

The point is: opening a new railway or tramway does not necessarily have any effect on congestion. It depends. So if congestion relief is the objective, NGT may well not be an appropriate response.

The idea that, ‘apart from Sheffield, UK tram systems are hugely successful’ is nonsense. The Manchester Metrolink has been plagued with technical problems. The Birmingham Midland Metro was supposed to carry 14 to 15 million passengers per annum from day one; its actual patronage has flatlined at around 5 million. The city of Edinburgh ‘lost faith‘ with its tramway years ago (it hasn’t even opened yet). And the Merseyside Passenger Transport Executive managed to waste £70 million on a light rail system that was never built.

Written by beleben

April 25, 2013 at 3:21 pm

Imitation of tram, part two

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The West Yorkshire PTE and Leeds city council ‘Programme Entry’ NGT trolleybus route is 14.3 km long, with 56% segregation, and costed at £250.6 million (September 2011).

The Besançon tramway is 14.6 km long, and costed at 228 million euro (£193.8 million at the current rate of exchange).

So the Leeds imitation tram is budgeted to cost more than Besançon’s real tram.

Written by beleben

April 25, 2013 at 10:55 am

Captured in the gobbledegook

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The Leeds New Generation Transport (NGT) trolleybus project will ease traffic congestion by providing fast and reliable journeys, according to an 18-page document produced by West Yorkshire PTE.

Does the available ‘supporting documentation’ support those claims?

NGT Run Times report

NGT Reliability report

LTM Highway Model Validation Report

LTM Demand Model Validation Report

LTM NGT Model Validation Report

The reports are (surprise, surprise) indigestible gobbledegook. But it seems that ‘speeding-up of journeys’ ascribed to NGT would be largely due to non-NGT-specific factors, such as introduction of smartcards, etc.

On the NGT North and South corridors, is it that

(a) all journeys that are speeded up/made more reliable, or
(b) all bus journeys, or
(c) all trolleybus journeys, or
(d) something else?

The NGT route is built around serving motorists from park and ride sites. So, how are motorists’ access times (to drive to and park up at the park and ride) captured in the gobbledegook?

Written by beleben

April 24, 2013 at 4:24 pm

Posted in Leeds

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HS2 and lock-in

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Theoretical framework for lock-in (Cantarelli, Chantal C; Flyvbjerg, Bent; et al)

The 2010 paper ‘Lock-in and its influence on the project performance of large-scale transportation infrastructure projects’ (Cantarelli, Chantal C; Flyvbjerg, Bent; Van Wee, Bert; and Molin, Eric J E) looked at transport megaprojects, cost overruns, and how politicians and decision-makers can be trapped into pursuing ineffective courses of action. The authors focused on two case studies from the Netherlands, but the parallels with Britain’s HS2 project are immediately obvious.

3 Case study:the Betuweroute

The Betuweroute is a freight-transport railway line of about 160 km between the port of Rotterdam and the European hinterland. It was finally opened in 2007 after a long decision-making process. As long ago as the early 1980s, the construction of a new railway line was proposed to deal with the unsatisfactory rail connections of the main port Rotterdam (Priemus, 2007), thus improving the connections between the hinterland and the main port and strengthening the national economy. The Betuweroute project was approved by the Dutch House of Representatives in 1994, after much public debate questioning its desirability and necessity. The project was then reconsidered but this did not influence the outcome, and in 1996 the decision to build the project was taken. This case study involves a systematic search for the presence or absence of lock-in indicators (that is, sunk costs, a need for justification, escalating commitment, and inflexibility and the closure of alternatives).

3.1 Decision-making level

The project was incorporated into the policy plans in 1990 as the SVVII (Second Transport and Structure Plan) as a solution to the problem of insufficient railway capacity for freight transport to accommodate expected future growth. This created an excessive focus on the Betuweroute itself and shified attention away from the problems (that is, the solution was taken as a starting point) (TCI, 2004a). Politician Hermans, chairman of the commission on the Betuweroute, concluded that in a manner of speaking, the decision was taken first after which arguments played a role (De Gelderlander, 1995 in Roscam Abbing et al, 1999, page 13). Priemus (2007, page 630) reached similar conclusions: “the solution was decided upon at a very early stage of the process.” This excessive focus indicates the presence of escalating commitment by politicians to the project in the decision-making process. The number of agreements, another criterion for escalating commitment, also contributed to overcommitment to the project. Examples of this include the Agreement of Warnemuende (with Germany about the connection to the German railway network) and agreements relating to the project’s inclusion in the SVVII. These agreements formalised the decision to construct the railway line. The problem analysis remained narrow, focusing on identifying opportunities to develop Rotterdam harbour as a main port (Priemus, 2007), with the result that the decision-making process was inflexible and incomplete (focusing solely on railway connections instead of other options to increase the strength of the main port) and alternatives to the Betuweroute were not really considered.

Although the Betuweroute project was labelled as indicative rather than decisive in SVVII, the Dutch Railway Company had investigated the specific implementation of the Betuweroute (Ministry ofTransport, 1996-2007; Pestman, 2001; TCI, 2004a) in the project memorandum, thus limiting itself to studying this solution alone and failing to consider alternatives (for example, zero plus alternatives alternatives in modality, and rail alternatives). For example, a possible alternative increasing the capacity of inland waterway transport was never fully considered. Several other alternatives, such as joint hinterland connection by rail between Rotterdam and Antwerp, using the existing railway network more intensively, and underground construction were also not taken seriously or were proposed far too late to add anything to the discussion.


4 Case study: HSL-South

This case study involves a systematic search for the presence or absence of lock-in indicators at the decision-making and project levels. After the success of the high-speed railway connection between Paris and Lyon, the idea of a European network of high speed railway trains emerged. In 1986, the ministers responsible in France, Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands agreed to develop an HSL-network between Paris, Brussels, and Amsterdam, with the HSL-South as the Dutch section. Procedures of a PKB started in 1986 and, after several delays. part of the HSL-South (the part between Amsterdam and Rotterdam) opened in September 2009.

4.1 Decision-making level

In the decision-making process of the HSL-South, path dependency played an important role. During international consultations, decisions were taken about the mode of transport, time schedule, financing, and the specific characteristics of the different tracks (de Vries et al, 2007). For example, a decision was taken not to use existing infrastructure for the main part of the railway but to construct new infrastructure. With regard to the design speed, decisions had already been taken and the railway line had to be suitable for high-speed traffic of 300 km/h. These decisions at the international level set limitations on the decisions to be made at the national level, creating inflexibility for national policy. This was seen in the SVVII, which confirmed connection of the Netherlands to the European network of high-speed railway lines and the construction of a new railway line between Rotterdam and the Belgium border suitable for high speeds of 300 km/h. With the acceptance of this plan by the Dutch Lower Chamber, the Netherlands embedded international agreements into national policy (de Vries et al, 2007). These agreements, which made decisions binding, indicate the over-commitment to the project. Furthermore, there was escalating commitment in the assumptions regarding the HSL-South project: despite the lack of any conclusions about the desirability or necessity of the high-speed railway line the government considered the Dutch connection to the European HSL network to be essential. This illustrates a common problem in the decision making surrounding large projects: the solution, rather than the problem, was taken as a starting point.

Written by beleben

April 24, 2013 at 2:45 pm

Euston Cross HS2, part two

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Lord Bradshaw and Lord Berkeley are meeting HS2 Ltd officials this week to discuss their “largely cost neutral” Euston Cross proposal, Rail technology magazine reported.


A combined Euston Cross station complex for all Midlands, Northern and Scottish intercity and high speed railways, with extensive passenger transfer capability.

Achieved by east-west deep-level HS2 tunnel with platforms, extending between Euston, St Pancras and Kings Cross, replacing additional Euston terminal capacity, and located under the northern part of those termini. Fewer platforms needed with through train operations.

HS2 trains would also use the existing (adapted) Euston terminus, as many are direct replacements of the existing West Coast Main Line (WCML) intercity services. Capacity is freed up at Euston terminus, eg by diversion of existing suburban trains to Crossrail.

Key wins are:

• Greater national and London/Home Counties economic capacity: avoids most economic negatives caused by land take in the Euston area.

• Largely cost-neutral: omits many current HS2 proposed works including high-risk elements, substitutes others.

• Capability of phased development: eases financial pressures on national economy.

• Environmentally much stronger compared to current HS2 proposals: Less residential and business disturbance and land take throughout Euston and Camden.

• No harmful impact on existing North London Line: safeguards passenger and freight operations.

• Avoids the current poor value for money HS2-HS1 scheme: with its low capacity and inability to be used by domestic services.

• Maximises international connectivity: direct passenger links between Euston and St Pancras.

• Option to reduce Old Oak interchange costs and complexity: potential to omit international platforms and include them within Euston Cross, if separate platforms are still necessary.

• A surface access solution for many airport hub and expansion schemes: supports projects currently being considered by the Davies Commission.

• Capacity for through domestic, as well as international, trains: between HS2/WCML and East London/Kent/East Anglia.

• Through trains achieve stronger economic benefits east of Central London: within the East & SE London, East Anglia and Kent priority growth areas.

• Future-proofed cross-London east-west rail capacity beyond Crossrail.

Other passenger benefits:

• A national intercity passenger hub for Central London, serving all Midlands, North, Central and North Wales, and Scottish destinations

• Full integration of northern main line intercity and high speed routes with minimal disturbance to passengers’ familiarity with stations (Euston Cross would be accessible from all three existing termini)

• Relief of interchange pressure at Euston as HS2 load is distributed also across St Pancras and Kings Cross

• Direct Crossrail-WCML services for London and Home Counties commuters

• Direct London & Home Counties regional services, eg Milton Keynes-Kent.

Outline specification

Design principles

Build two rather than three single track tunnels from Old Oak Common, via Queens Park station, then under Regents Park to a new east-west deep station (Euston Cross) under the Northern ends of Euston, St Pancras and Kings Cross stations.

These two tunnels can then continue to join HS1 tunnels between Stratford and St Pancras.

Link the two tunnels at Queens Park to the WCML lines, to allow HS2 UK-gauge trains to enter the existing Euston station.

The Euston Cross would have at least two pairs of two platforms (more if separate ones are needed for any through international trains calling), and would link the three main line surface stations and Underground ones.

A lower scale of construction works would be needed to expand the Euston terminus approaches and any additional platforms, compared to HS2 proposals.

There would be no HS1-2 link from Primrose Hill to York Way, currently proposed by HS2 with severe impact through Camden.


WCML local suburban services would be diverted into Crossrail near Old Oak Common, as already being investigated by the DfT. This would save a number of Euston surface station platforms and make them available after adaptation for intercity or HS2 trains.

Remaining and revised commuter and longer distance trains via the existing WCML would continue to use Euston surface station. With a complementary ramp in the Kensal-Queens Park area, WCML trains could also traverse London via the Euston Cross route.

HS2 trains could go either to Euston surface station via a new incline at Queens Park, or into the deep station Euston Cross. Some could continue to Stratford and Ebbsfleet.

It is suggested that Euston Cross platforms could be adaptable for GC-gauge trains, while UK-gauge trains (the bulk of HS2 to begin with) could use Euston terminus or Euston Cross.

Operational flexibility

Much of Euston HS2’s land take is caused by the platform capacity required to handle an entire railway’s volume of terminating trains.

This is not needed on anything like this scale, if trains can continue towards HS1 via Euston Cross. A proportion of domestic and international high speed trains could continue to Stratford International and Ebbsfleet. Other domestic trains could terminate at Euston Cross, but continue to the Temple Mills spur for servicing and to reverse in the Eurostar depot.

A second connection east of Euston Cross might be relevant if the Davies Commission identifies an airport hub location east or north-East of London. In that case the Euston Cross route would have a major role as an airport connector from much of England as well as from the Home Counties.

For resilience and to mitigate occasions of perturbation, the dual platforming at Euston with the existing terminal and deep-level would create more service durability.

Through London & Home Counties regional trains should be feasible via Euston Cross, subject to timetabling and platform capacity.

Frequency for those trains would be less than a standard ‘Crossrail’, as they would be a share of the Euston Cross tunnel capacity. However they would free up further space at Euston terminus for HS2 and replacement WCML trains.

Local impact

Environmental impact and residential impact would be less at Euston though passenger handling would still need to be addressed at this London station and related passenger links at St Pancras and Kings Cross.

Interchange handling would be easier by spreading the flows through three London stations and onto all their distribution networks including Thameslink.

The Kensal-Queens Park area would experience some additional impact because of the WCML connections to/from the HS2 tunnel, though this would be compensated by no impact in the Primrose Hill-Camden Road area as is currently expected.

There would be new intermediate ventilation and emergency exit shafts at different locations to the present proposal. The Old Oak Common eastbound HS2 tunnel design would be simpler.

Rebalancing costs

The main savings are:

• Proposed HS2 twin tunnels between Old Oak Common and Euston HS2 platforms.

• Proposed HS2-HS1 single-track tunnel between Old Oak Common and Primrose Hill.

• Surface works and surface mitigation between Primrose Hill, Camden Road and HS1 tunnel.

• Full-scale Euston HS2 terminus with all environmental, residential and business upheaval. Other community impacts reduced by the new Euston proposals.

• Euston interchange arrangements mitigated partially by some passenger interchange and onwards distribution being re-allocated to the St Pancras/Kings Cross area.

• Passenger and terminus capacity impacts of fewer commuter trains serving Euston terminus, after diversion of WCML local trains to Crossrail 1 and some WCML longer distance commuter trains to the Euston Cross route.

• Depot and servicing sidings savings if HS2 can use Temple Mills Eurostar depot.

The main new costs are:

• HS2 twin tunnels between Old Oak and Euston Cross, and on to HS1, via Queens Park (WCML and Euston terminus link) and under Regents Park to an new east-west deep-level station.

• Interchange works at St Pancras and Kings Cross.

• Connection works with HS1/Temple Mills.

Costs transferred between the previous scheme and the new one include:

• Reconstruction of Euston station with larger public area, to achieve greater integration with the surrounding community and green transport links.

• Passenger links between Euston and St Pancras/Kings Cross with Crossrail 2, and other public transport.

Operational matters

Handling services

HS2 has foreseen its timetable as 10 trains per hour (tph) covering ex-WCML flows, and 6 tph covering ex-East Midlands and ECML flows. Up to 12 trains per hour are foreseen on the ‘classic’ WCML, excluding the 8 suburban trains diverted to Crossrail 1 from near Willesden Junction. London Overground trains to Euston (3 tph) may or may not continue, or be diverted via Camden Road to Stratford.

This is a combined total of 28 tph approaching Euston, to be directed at Queens Park between the 2 approach tracks to Euston terminus (WCML slow and WCML fast) and the Euston Cross tunnel, an average of 9-10 tph per track. The through tunnel design for Euston Cross should accommodate a higher proportion of the total train volume.

Euston Cross station could be equipped with several platforms in each direction, eg two for UK-gauge intercity and WCML/London area services, and one (if required) for GC-gauge trains. This is similar to the arrangement at Berlin Hauptbahnhof, where trains to the same destination often use either the high or low level platforms. Continuation of the Euston Cross trains to other destinations or to reverse at Temple Mills Depot would reduce dwell time at the station and increase its hourly capacity.

The onwards links could be a connection with the HS1 tunnel (allowing access to HS1 and to Temple Mills depot), and a connection towards tracks to whichever non-Heathrow airport was selected as Britain’s new hub.

Would length of current Euston station platforms be sufficient for HS2 trains? Details of HS2 trains are not yet available; only a few platforms are capable of taking the 16 car sleeper services, but the existing platforms could probably be lengthened at the London end to take the continental length of two ICE or TGV train formations if these are thought necessary.

HS1 capacity

With all the trains running within a narrow speed band (140-186 mph) the capacity of HS1 should be capable of being enhanced to the same as HS2, i.e. 16 trains per hour per direction.

Economic and civic benefits

A modern interchange hub for the central London, with excellent links between the three main line stations, and with Underground, similar to Berlin Hauptbahnhof, Paris Chatelet etc.

Retains city centre terminus location, as preferred by HS2, and also allows through services across London to Stratford and beyond, helping regeneration of the eastern parts of London and Kent. Stratford is closer to Canary Wharf than Euston and is the hub for the east of London where economic regeneration is likely to be greater in the future compared with the west.

Improved Underground interchange at Euston Cross, allowing dispersal from HS2 to Thameslink the Piccadilly Line as well as existing tubes and Crossrail 2.

Retains good connections to Crossrail and other lines at Old Oak Common, as well as good interchange to Heathrow and wherever a future UK airport hub is located.

No need to demolish 500 properties etc West of Euston station, and no need for intrusive new line at Camden Road to connect HS1 to 2.

Dovetailing within HS2 project

Project timings

To change the station arrangements at the London end or elsewhere would probably add two years to the project. However, it is understood that the HS2 Euston construction project is on the critical path so other sections might be able to be opened sooner.

There is no reason why HS2 phase 1 should not be constructed and opened as far as Old Oak Common, with initial services terminating there, or with initial services returning to Euston terminus via Queens Park. With efficient turnround, the six platforms at Old Oak could be sufficient for the first couple of years (eg, arrive, turn round and depart in 20-30 minutes).

Construction of the link tunnels as far as Queens Park would need to be completed physically since tunnel boring is required to start at OOC. However the Euston Cross route and tunnels could be constructed from a tunnel boring site at Queens Park so could be timed independently of the rest of HS2 phase 1.

So OOC to HS1 could be a separate hybrid bill, or added to the existing one if that gets delayed due to a decision to include the northern ‘Y’ parts in it as well.

Overall, there is no reason why a new layout at the London end should delay the start of services at least from OOC to Birmingham and the North West.

Next steps

The Secretary of State is requested to alter the remit of HS2 to consider urgently an alternative option for the lines East of Old Oak Common station providing for a better connection to Euston, less disruption and demolition of properties in that area, through running via a Euston low level (Euston Cross) to HS1 and beyond, and avoiding the necessity to build a HS1-2 connection through the Camden Road area.

HS1 should also be requested to form a steering group of stakeholder representatives to ensure maximum speed and decision making.

The Davies Commission should be asked to include Euston Cross proposals in its consideration of surface access options for future UK airport capacity.

Bill Bradshaw/Tony Berkeley, House of Lords, February 2013, acknowledging with thanks advice from Jonathan Roberts.

“With all the trains running within a narrow speed band (140-186 mph) the capacity of HS1 should be capable of being enhanced to the same as HS2, i.e. 16 [?] trains per hour per direction.” But the theoretical capacity of HS1 is already 20 trains per hour. That headway does not operate because (a) there is not enough demand, and (b) the Southeastern domestic trains cannot keep pace.

It’s possible that a variant of Euston Cross could end up as part of the official HS2 scheme. But of course, that doesn’t mean that’s it’s value for money — or workable.

Written by beleben

April 23, 2013 at 4:48 pm

Posted in High speed rail, HS2

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